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The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule
William Baude† & Ryan D. Doerfler††
When should a court interpreting some statutory provision consider information besides the text—legislative history, surrounding provisions, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.? This might be one of the most asked questions of
statutory interpretation.
One recurring answer in the Court’s cases is the “plain meaning rule,” which
is something of a compromise. If the statute’s meaning is “plain,” the other information can’t be considered. If it isn’t plain, the information comes in. The rule seems
to make obvious sense as an intermediate position between strict textualism and
some form of pragmatism.
And yet, once we think a little more deeply about the plain meaning rule, we
ought to see that its basic structure is puzzling. Information that is relevant
shouldn’t normally become irrelevant just because the text is clear. And vice versa:
irrelevant information shouldn’t become useful just because the text is less than
clear. We can sketch some conditions under which this puzzling structure could be
justified, but we highly doubt that they could justify the plain meaning rule in its
current form.

† Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
†† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. We appreciate
helpful comments and criticisms from Larry Alexander, Samuel Bray, Eric Citron, Jonah
Gelbach, Abbe Gluck, Richard McAdams, Sean Mirski, Eric Posner, Richard Re, Stephen
Sachs, Adam Samaha, Frederick Schauer, Asher Steinberg, James Stern, David Strauss,
Ilan Wurman, the participants in the Legislation Roundtable at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We also appreciate research support from the SNR Denton Fund and the Alumni Faculty Fund, and excellent research assistance from Kelly Holt.

539

01 BAUDE&DOERFLER_ART_IC (DO NOT DELETE)

540

The University of Chicago Law Review

6/19/2017 9:45 PM

[84:539

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 540
I. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE .......................................................................... 541
II. THE PUZZLE ................................................................................................. 546
III. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS ........................................................................... 549
A. Cost Efficiency..................................................................................... 549
B. Bias .................................................................................................... 552
C. Legal Convention ................................................................................ 554
D. Public-Facing Explanation ................................................................. 556
E. Predictability and Consistency ........................................................... 558
F. Contract Analogies .............................................................................. 563
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 565

INTRODUCTION
Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form.
They allow consideration of outside information—legislative history, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if
the statute’s text1 is unclear or ambiguous. These tenets are often
expressed as a variation of the “plain meaning rule.” If the text’s
meaning is “plain,” the other information can’t be considered. If it
isn’t plain, the information comes in.
On its surface, the rule has an intuitive appeal. It seems like
a safe intermediate position between strict textualism and some
form of all-things-considered eclecticism or pragmatism. But if we
poke below the surface, we ought to see that the basic structure
of the plain meaning rule is quite puzzling. In our normal lives,
in most contexts under the rules of evidence, and elsewhere, information is either useful or not. Information that is relevant
shouldn’t normally become irrelevant just because the text is
clear. And vice versa, irrelevant information shouldn’t become
useful just because the text is less than clear.
This puzzling structure—“consider only in case of ambiguity”—deserves investigation. In this Article, we first explain the
puzzle more formally, and then begin that investigation. It turns
out that we can sketch some conditions under which this puzzling
structure could be justified, for certain kinds of evidence. But nobody has shown that the plain meaning rule in fact meets these
conditions, and we rather doubt that they could justify the plain

1
To be sure, considering “just” the text requires attention to minimal information
about the text (for example, that it is a legislative text). See generally John R. Searle,
Literal Meaning, 13 Erkenntnis 207 (1978).
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meaning rule across the board. More importantly, we suspect that
most interpreters have never even asked themselves the question.
Note that we do not take a position on whether one ought to
be a textualist or an intentionalist or something else in the first
place. That is of course “the big debate”2 in statutory interpretation. Similarly, we take no position here on the correct theory of
statutory “meaning.”3 This is not to deny that there are right answers to these questions. But the plain meaning rule attempts to
transcend those debates, and our criticisms of it do, too.
Textualists who think they have good reasons to ignore legislative history or the like shouldn’t automatically cave when the
statute is ambiguous. Intentionalists who insist that legislative
history is relevant shouldn’t automatically discard it when the
text by itself seems clear. The plain meaning rule asks both sides
to surrender the courage of their convictions. That surrender has
not been justified, and perhaps cannot be.
I. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
The plain meaning rule says that otherwise-relevant information about statutory meaning is forbidden when the statutory
text is plain or unambiguous. To see the rule in action, we need
not look far. Consider one of the Court’s recent and entertaining
statutory interpretation cases, Yates v United States,4 in which
the Court split 4–1–4 on interpreting a provision of the SarbanesOxley Act of 20025 that is now codified at 18 USC § 1519.6 Did
§ 1519’s prohibition on impeding a federal investigation by
“knowingly . . . conceal[ing] . . . any record, document, or tangible
object”7 apply to a boat captain who threw undersized fish back

2
William N. Eskridge Jr, Book Review, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 Colum L Rev 531, 532 (2013). See also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum L Rev 1189, 1241 (2006) (observing the “lively
and ongoing academic debate over whether it is legitimate for courts to rely on extratextual sources when construing statutes”) (emphasis omitted).
3
See Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U Chi L Rev 1235, 1243–52 (2015). See also Frederick
Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L Rev 797, 798–99 (1982).
4
135 S Ct 1074 (2015).
5
Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745.
6
Yates, 135 S Ct at 1079 (Ginsburg) (plurality).
7
18 USC § 1519. We might be accused of stacking the deck in the government’s favor
by omitting the other verbs from our quotation. See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1086 (Ginsburg) (plurality) (relying on the verbs); id at 1089–90 (Alito concurring in the judgment) (same). But
we’re not actually concerned here with the many other interpretive moves in Yates, so we
assure you they are omitted without prejudice.
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into the sea?8 In particular, could “tangible object” include things
that are quite different from records and documents?9 Five justices said no; four said yes.
There is much to be said about the case,10 but for our purposes
the noteworthy exchange was about the relevance of the statute’s
title. The plurality, which narrowly construed the statute, started
by pointing out that both the provision’s caption11 and the title of
its section of the statute12 mentioned only “records” and “documents.”13 While “not commanding,” the plurality said, these headings “supply cues” that “tangible object” should be construed very
narrowly.14 Justice Samuel Alito, who concurred in the judgment
and provided the fifth vote for the defendant, similarly noted that
his view was “influenced by § 1519’s title.”15
Justice Elena Kagan wrote the dissent. She replied that the
Court had never before “relied on a title to override the law’s clear
terms.”16 Instead, she invoked “the wise rule that the title of a
statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” 17 This is an instance of the plain meaning rule,
whose key feature is to deny the relevance of other interpretive
data if the text’s meaning is “plain” or “clear.”
Invocations of the rule are common. That same term, in King
v Burwell,18 the Court dutifully reported that “[i]f the statutory
language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.”19

8

See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1078–79 (Ginsburg) (plurality).
See id at 1079 (Ginsburg) (plurality).
10 See generally, for example, Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates and the
Statutes We Threw Away, 18 Green Bag 2d 377 (2015); Richard M. Re, The New Holy
Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2d 407 (2015).
11 See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1083 (Ginsburg) (plurality). See also 18 USC § 1519 (captioning the section “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy”).
12 See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1083 (Ginsburg) (plurality). See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 802, 116 Stat at 800 (entitling the section “Criminal penalties for altering documents”).
13 See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1083 (Ginsburg) (plurality).
14 Id (Ginsburg) (plurality).
15 Id at 1090 (Alito concurring in the judgment).
16 Id at 1094 (Kagan dissenting).
17 Yates, 135 S Ct at 1094 (Kagan dissenting) (emphasis added), quoting Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co, 331 US 519, 528–29 (1947). See
also Trainmen, 331 US at 528 (“Where the text is complicated and prolific, headings and
titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most general manner; to attempt to
refer to each specific provision would often be ungainly as well as useless.”).
18 135 S Ct 2480 (2015).
19 Id at 2489. As many probably know, the Court found that the language was not
plain. Id at 2490.
9
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Often, the rule is invoked to forbid reliance on a specific kind
of source. The statutory titles ignored by Kagan’s opinion in Yates
may seem like a minor point, but consider these perhaps more
significant examples:
Legislative History. Despite legislative history’s critics, the
Supreme Court as a whole has not categorically foresworn the use
of legislative history. In some opinions, however, it has said that
legislative history can be considered only if the text is ambiguous
or unclear. In Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill,20 for instance, the
Court said that “[w]hen confronted with a statute which is plain
and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning.”21 Similarly, in its more
recent decision in United States v Woods,22 the Court dismissed
legislative history arguments with a footnote saying: “We do not
consider Woods’ arguments based on legislative history. Whether
or not legislative history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted
when, as here, the statutory text is unambiguous.”23 Similar invocations of the rule are plentiful.24
Policy Considerations. Once again, the Court has certainly
deemed the practical consequences or policy implications of interpretation to be relevant in some cases. But it has also said that
they need not be considered when the meaning of the text is plain.
For example, in Carcieri v Salazar,25 the Court concluded that it
“need not consider [ ] competing policy views” in interpreting the
statutory language “because Congress’ use of the word ‘now’ . . .
speaks for itself.”26 Similarly, in Sebelius v Cloer,27 the Court
turned aside the government’s arguments that the Vaccine Act28
“should be construed so as to minimize complex and costly fees
litigation,” concluding that such “policy arguments come into play

20

437 US 153 (1978).
Id at 184 n 29.
22 134 S Ct 557 (2013).
23 Id at 567 n 5.
24 See, for example, Milner v Department of the Navy, 562 US 562, 572 (2011) (refusing to “allow[ ] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language”); Lamie
v United States Trustee, 540 US 526, 533–34 (2004); Barnhart v Sigmon Coal Co, 534 US
438, 457 (2002).
25 555 US 379 (2009).
26 Id at 392.
27 133 S Ct 1886 (2013).
28 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-660, 100 Stat 3755,
codified at 42 USC § 300aa-1 et seq.
21
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only to the extent that the Vaccine Act is ambiguous,”29 which it
was not.30
Practice. The plain meaning rule may also operate to forbid
invocations of practice. For instance, in United States v Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc,31 the Court concluded that “pre-Code practice”
was relevant to interpreting the Bankruptcy Code only if the text
was not clear.32 And in Milner v Department of the Navy,33 the
Court rejected the government’s and dissent’s invocations of
thirty years of lower court practice “even if true, because we have
no warrant to ignore clear statutory language on the ground that
other courts have done so.”34
Substantive Canons. Several of the so-called substantive canons of interpretation turn on whether the statute is ambiguous,
and so they present instances of the plain meaning rule as well.35
For instance, the Court has rejected an “effort to avoid the plain
meaning of the statute” by “invok[ing] the canon of constitutional
avoidance,” because “that canon ‘has no application in the absence
of statutory ambiguity.’” 36 The same may be true of a range of
other substantive canons.37
All of them. Other times, the rule is invoked more categorically, as in this oft-quoted statement in Connecticut National
Bank v Germain:38
[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to
one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and
again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says

29

Cloer, 133 S Ct at 1895 (brackets and quotation marks omitted).
Id at 1896.
31 489 US 235 (1989).
32 Id at 245–46.
33 562 US 562 (2011).
34 Id at 575–76.
35 These are an apt example only to the extent that substantive considerations are
used as evidence of statutory meaning, and not as policy tools used to fill statutory gaps.
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const Commen
95, 105–07 (2010).
36 Department of Housing and Urban Development v Rucker, 535 US 125, 134 (2002),
quoting United States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 US 483, 494 (2001).
37 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv
L Rev 2118, 2146–56 (2016).
38 503 US 249 (1992).
30
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there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.39
Again, in each instance the role of the plain meaning rule is not
to categorically rule these sources in or out. Rather, it is to make
them contingently irrelevant. The category of extraneous information is not considered if the statute is plain, but can be if it is
not plain.
Two notes of clarification before proceeding. First, we should
note that the word “plain” is (ironically) itself ambiguous. Courts
and scholars sometimes use the phrase “plain meaning” to denote
something like ordinary meaning—that is, the normal meaning,
or the meaning one would normally attribute to those words given
little information about their context.40 The ordinary meaning is
“plain” in the sense of “plain vanilla.” But the plain meaning rule
uses the phrase in a different sense, to denote obvious meaning—
that is, the meaning that is clear.41 Here, meaning is “plain” in
the sense of “plain to view.” Again, the plain meaning rule uses
this latter sense of “plain”—the meaning that is clear or obvious.
Second, while the “rule” is asserted in plenty of cases and has
been defended by Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan
Garner as “essentially sound,”42 we do not mean to assert that the
plain meaning rule is inviolably observed. For despite the rule
that plain text is supposed to be preclusive, the Court has also
said that the “meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or

39 Id at 253–54 (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also John F. Manning,
The New Purposivism, 2011 S Ct Rev 113, 126–27 (suggesting that “the Court’s new approach” to statutory interpretation “is perhaps best captured by the Court’s oft-cited opinion in Connecticut National Bank v Germain”).
40 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 S Ct Rev 231, 251. See also David A. Strauss, Why Plain
Meaning?, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 1565, 1565 (1997) (treating “‘ordinary’ or ‘plain’ meaning” as “interchangeable”). As Professor Frederick Schauer has observed, the “plainness”
of statutory meaning in this sense is complicated by the question whether statutory language is ordinary or technical. See generally Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 San Diego L Rev 501 (2015). To the extent that statutory language consists of
terms of art familiar to lawyers, such language might have a “plain” technical meaning—
the meaning a lawyer would normally attribute to the words upon knowing they were
uttered by another lawyer.
41 See, for example, Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 US at 242 (“The language and punctuation Congress used cannot be read in any other way. By the plain language of the statute, the two types of recovery are distinct.”) (citation omitted and emphases added).
42 Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 436 (Thomson/West 2012). Scalia and Garner acknowledge the difficulty of determining what is unambiguous. See note 94.
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phrases may only become evident when placed in context,”43 and
context is sometimes conceived quite expansively. Indeed, Professor William Eskridge Jr has argued that, despite invocations of
the plain meaning rule, “[i]n a significant number of cases, the
Court has pretty much admitted that it was displacing plain
meaning with apparent legislative intent or purpose gleaned from
legislative history.”44
But our point stands regardless of whether the plain meaning
rule is really a “rule” or merely a common trope. Our inquiry here
is fundamentally normative—when does this kind of contingent
irrelevance make sense? As we hope to show, the answer to that
question is far trickier than most everybody seems to assume.
II. THE PUZZLE
Upon closer examination, there is something puzzling about
the plain meaning rule. There are reasons to consider all pertinent information. There are reasons to categorically discard certain kinds of pertinent information. But why consider it only
sometimes?
For examples of considering all pertinent information, think
of federal agencies, which “must consider” all “significant comments” received during notice-and-comment rulemaking,45 even if
they were very confident in their proposed rule in the first place.
The Environmental Protection Agency, likewise, must consider
cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants, no matter
the degree of noneconomic concern.46 Along the same lines, Jeremy
Bentham famously advocated a system of “free proof,” or admission of all logically relevant evidence, on the grounds that it “was
simply ordinary epistemology applied to legal matters.”47
Conversely, to Bentham’s likely dismay, the law is also full of
cases in which information is excluded, whether because it is intrinsically irrelevant or normatively problematic or too likely to

43 Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 120,
132 (2000).
44 William N. Eskridge Jr, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621, 628 (1990).
45 Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1203 (2015), citing Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 416 (1971).
46 See Michigan v Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S Ct 2699, 2707–08 (2015).
47 Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U Pa
L Rev 165, 169 (2006), discussing generally Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice (Hunt & Clark 1827).
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mislead.48 Federal trial courts, for example, exclude most evidence
of character or past acts.49 And federal antidiscrimination laws
prohibit employers from basing employment decisions on an applicant’s race, religion, or sex.50
These categorical exclusions are easy for most to accept. But
why make otherwise-relevant information only conditionally admissible? If legislative history is truly bad evidence of statutory
meaning, shouldn’t it be ignored both when the meaning is plain
and when it is less than clear? Conversely, if it is good evidence,
shouldn’t we always at least look at it, even when the text seems
pretty clear on its own? Why should legislative history’s admissibility depend on the evidence we get from another source, like the
text?
As we explain below, one might be able to construct a justification for considering pertinent information only sometimes—but
such a limit makes sense only if that “sometimes” is connected to
some epistemic or other practical end. What makes little sense is
a blanket prohibition against considering pertinent nontextual
information if statutory language is “clear.” This is especially so
if the courts’ main concern is interpretive accuracy—that is, getting it right. Courts justify adherence to the plain meaning rule
as a way to avoid interpretive mistakes, but the rule seems illsuited to the task.
To see the concern more formally, suppose that plain-language
clarity is factive: that is, if it is “clear” that some statutory language means that p, then that language means that p in fact. So
understood, to say that statutory language’s meaning is “clear” is
akin to saying that its meaning is known—if, after all, a court
knows that some statutory language means that p, then that language in fact means that p.51 As a linguistic matter, this is a plausible analysis of “clear.” The problem is that if this is what courts
mean by “clear,” then the plain meaning rule does no work with
respect to accuracy. If a court knows that some statutory language
means that p just on the basis of the plain text, then considering,

48 See Schauer, 155 U Pa L Rev at 194 (cited in note 47) (“[T]he idea of Free Proof
may have more cognitive and epistemic disadvantages than Bentham thought almost two
centuries ago.”).
49 See FRE 404.
50 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
51 See Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits 34 (Oxford 2000).
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say, legislative history is pointless but also harmless.52 This is because the court knows, in turn, that the corresponding legislative
history is misleading to the extent that it indicates the statutory
language means something other than that p.
Suppose then that courts in this area are instead speaking
loosely, and that when a court says that statutory language is
“clear,” what it means is that it has a high degree of confidence in
a particular reading just on the basis of the text. On this understanding, there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that
the court has such high confidence that nothing in the legislative
history could possibly dissuade it. But, if this is the case, then the
analysis is the same as above: considering legislative history is
pointless but harmless. The second possibility is that, in principle,
something in the legislative history could dissuade the court. If
this is the case, however, then refusal to consider legislative history amounts to something like willful ignorance. In the case of
the second possibility, the prohibitions at issue do have an effect,
but the effect is mischievous.53 As Judge Henry Friendly observed, it is “[i]llogical . . . to hold that a ‘plain meaning’ shut[s]
off access to the very materials that might show it not to have
been plain at all.”54
Implicit in all of this, of course, is the assumption that the
nontextual evidence at issue is neither intrinsically irrelevant nor
more likely than not to mislead. If courts may consider legislative
history if the plain statutory text is not clear, then legislative history sheds light on interpretive questions. But it is easy to see
how the same point works for those who categorically reject using
legislative history because it is “counterproductive” or error
prone.55 If those concerns make legislative history so unreliable
52 This is putting aside for a moment the cost of gathering and considering the evidence, which we discuss in Part III.A.
53 This is what differentiates the “plain meaning rule” invoked in the cases we cite
from a more sensible “presumption” in favor of the plain meaning that “is subject to rebuttal,” as described by John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 2399
(2003). This also differentiates it from rules of cumulativeness, or “marginal probative
value.” Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172, 185 (1997).
54 Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Henry
J. Friendly, Benchmarks 196, 206 (Chicago 1967). See also Pacific Gas and Electric Co v
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co, 442 P2d 641, 645 (Cal 1968) (in bank) (Traynor)
(“The exclusion of parol evidence . . . merely because the words do not appear ambiguous
to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that
was never intended.”) (emphasis added).
55 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan L Rev 1833, 1838 (1998)
(arguing that “problems of judicial competence create grave risks that judicial resort to
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that it should not even be considered when the text is clear, the
concerns do not go away just because the text is less clear. Better
to soldier on with one’s best estimate of the text’s meaning, even
if uncertain, than to introduce information that is more misleading than informative.
Our overall point is that the relevance of information is not
normally conditional. Either legislative history, statutory titles,
or what have you tell us something relevant about meaning or
they do not. But whether they do or do not, that does not suddenly
change when the text is clear. The puzzle is thus why courts
would ignore nontextual evidence only when textual evidence
points strongly in one direction.
III. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS
Having said all of that, we can imagine some justifications for
some applications of the plain meaning rule—that is, some cases
in which the conditional relevance of nontextual evidence could
make sense. But even so, we stress that these justifications are
both conditional and incomplete. They are conditional because
they are merely an outline of the circumstances under which a
plain meaning threshold might make sense. We do not think adherents to the rule have shown that those circumstances actually
obtain, and we are not sure that they do. They are incomplete because, even if those circumstances do obtain in some classes of
cases, they are unlikely to result in an across-the-board version of
the plain meaning rule.
A.

Cost Efficiency

The plain meaning rule might make sense for evidence that
is probative but also expensive to collect or consider.
To see this, suppose that considering information A is lowcost and easy whereas considering information B is expensive and
cumbersome. Even if A and B are equally reliable, it might make
sense, on a cost-efficiency rationale, to start by considering A, considering B only if A leaves you uncertain. After all, if considering
A is cheap and good enough for practical purposes, why incur the

legislative history to gauge legislative intent will prove counterproductive”); Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 31–32 (Princeton 1997)
(Amy Gutmann, ed) (“[T]he use of legislative history . . . is much more likely to produce a
false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine one.”).

01 BAUDE&DOERFLER_ART_IC (DO NOT DELETE)

550

The University of Chicago Law Review

6/19/2017 9:45 PM

[84:539

expense of considering B? The expected marginal benefit is low
and the cost high.56
Less abstractly, consider apartment hunting. Seeing an
apartment in person is a reliable way of assessing its suitability.
It also takes a great deal of time and energy. For that reason, one
will often reject an apartment just on the basis of pictures or information contained in a description (for example, square footage,
floor, etc.). Because one can consider such information quickly
and from the comfort of one’s couch, driving across town is often
simply not worth it.57 If an apartment is a clear “no” based just on
the ad, why bother? If, by contrast, the apartment is a “maybe,” it
is plausibly worth scheduling a visit.
Note that a cost-efficiency story for the plain meaning rule is
still a little tricky. In the apartment example above, many people
might find it less intuitive to accept an apartment and sign a lease
without ever bothering to see it in person, even if the square footage and price are perfect. Yet the plain meaning rule asks interpreters to ignore extraneous information both if the plain meaning of the statute is the equivalent of “yes” and if it is the
equivalent of “no.” That may be a tougher sell.
Moreover, the cost-efficiency justification for the plain meaning rule would have to justify the conditional exclusion of evidence.
Some scholars have argued, for example, that most nontextual
evidence should be categorically excluded in part on cost-efficiency
grounds.58 That kind of categorical argument, of course, is too
strong to yield the plain meaning rule. Rather, a cost-efficiency justification for the plain meaning rule would require a particular ratio of costs and accuracies such that the extra evidence is too
costly when A is clear, but not so costly that it is prohibitive when

56 See generally, for example, Remco Heesen, How Much Evidence Should One Collect?, 172 Philosophical Stud 2299 (2015) (discussing the trade-off between accuracy and
cost in the context of scientific research). See also Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and
Norms 60 (Princeton 1990) (observing that “[f]act-finding and evaluating the different
reasons for action consume time and effort,” and that these costs “will often outweigh the
marginal benefits” that “ensue from engaging in a complete assessment of the situation
on its merits”).
57 See Tim Logan, Apps, Sites Aim to Transform Apartment Rental Listings (LA
Times, Nov 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NNW3-ZX6L; Jonah Bromwich, Apartment Hunting with a Mobile App (NY Times, Mar 14, 2014), online at http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/03/16/nyregion/apartment-hunting-with-a-mobile-app.html (visited Mar 24,
2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
58 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional
Theory of Legal Interpretation 189–205 (Harvard 2006).
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A is unclear. Again, this is possible, but would require a more precise quantification of the decision costs of considering different
kinds of evidence than we have seen.59
A cost-efficiency justification for the plain meaning rule is at
least conceivable for some classes of evidence, but for others it is
not even plausible. Legislative history, for example, might be
time-consuming for courts to consider.60 The relevant documents
are often spread out rather than collected in a single place, and
even once they are collected it can take some time and mental
effort to put them in their proper context—a skill at which many
lawyers and law students are not particularly good.61 Thus, even
assuming that legislative history is probative with respect to statutory meaning, refusing to consider such history if the text is
“clear” might make sense for already overburdened courts. Again,
if considering just the text is cheap and good enough for practical
purposes, maybe it is sometimes better to move on to the next case
rather than to engage in additional, expensive investigation.62 In
this respect, legislative history contrasts sharply with, say, titles
or section headings, which are easy for courts to consider. It is
hard for us to imagine any cost-exclusion justification for excluding those kinds of materials.63

59 See id at 159 (“[S]o little work has been done to assess the empirical consequences
of interpretive choice.”).
60 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 36 (cited in note 55) (“The most immediate
and tangible change the abandonment of legislative history would effect is this: Judges,
lawyers, and clients will be saved an enormous amount of time and expense.”).
61 See Vermeule, 50 Stan L Rev at 1863–77 (cited in note 55). See also generally
Frederick Schauer, Our Informationally Disabled Courts, 143 Dædalus 105 (Summer
2014). But see Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L J 70, 91, 135 (2012) (arguing that “no one should try
to understand legislative history without understanding Congress’s own rules,” but then
asking: “Is it really ‘too complex’ or difficult for judges and academics to learn a dozen
congressional rules?”).
62 Professor Adrian Vermeule has noted this possibility. See Vermeule, Judging
under Uncertainty at 195 (cited in note 58) (“Intermediate solutions include a rule . . .
that consults legislative history only if the statute lacks a plain meaning.”). But he is
skeptical. See id (“[I]n practice such intermediate solutions prove highly unstable over
any extended period and inevitably dissolve back into plenary consideration of legislative history.”).
63 We also note that costs might vary over time. The cost of considering other statutes, for example, has decreased significantly with the development of electronic search
tools. See Ellie Margolis and Kristen E. Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books: Information
Literacy as the New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U Dayton L Rev 117, 121–26 (2012).
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Bias

Perhaps the plain meaning rule could make sense for certain
kinds of evidence that have both potential value but also a hardto-assess sort of bias.
To see this formally, imagine that we can consult information
A and/or B on some question. We know that A is 90 percent reliable
and that B is only 60 percent reliable. On the other hand, we also
know that once we consult B there is a substantial risk that we
will be incapable of rationally factoring in A’s response. Somehow
source B is so powerful or charismatic that we will start convincing ourselves to prefer it to A, or start using it to reinterpret A’s
response—even though A is more reliable than B!
In such a situation, something like the plain meaning rule
would be a rational result: consult A first, and consult B only if A
is unsure. This is better than always consulting both, because we
avoid the biasing effect of B in cases where A is more likely to be
correct. And it is probably better than never consulting B because
we avoid “throwing away” the relevant information of B in cases
where A is unsure.
Now, even in this scenario, it is not certain that consulting B
is a good idea, for two reasons. First, it is possible that there could
be moral objections to the form of bias at issue in B. (As we discuss, one could imagine that B involves demographic stereotypes
or political partisanship, for example.) If so, one might actually
prefer never to use B, even at the cost of accuracy. Second, even
in cases where A is unsure, A still might yield some information.
True equipoise is rare.64 So considering B when A is unsure still
risks overpowering the more reliable A with the less reliable B. It
is just that this is one of A’s less reliable moments, so the risk is
smaller.
To describe this much less formally, think of a job interview.
One might well think that a candidate’s suitability for a job is
best assessed by reading her resume. One might also think that
in-person interviews are a useful, but secondary, source of information about a candidate’s suitability. On the other hand, inperson interviews can introduce subconscious biases, favoring

64 See, for example, O’Neal v McAninch, 513 US 432, 435 (1995) (noting that in
“unusual” cases the judge might “feel[ ] himself in virtual equipose”).
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candidates who are more attractive, who have particular demographic characteristics, etc.65 And yet, because the biases are subconscious, one may not be able to fully correct for them either.
Indeed, one might worry that the irrelevant factors one learns
from the interview will color one’s view of the paper record in a
way that one can’t in good faith disentangle.66
In that case, it seems quite sensible for an employer to decide
that candidates with very strong or very weak paper records will
be in or out on that basis alone. The philosophy department at
Princeton, for example, does entry-level hiring without conducting in-person interviews for these and similar reasons.67 (Or for
certain jobs, instead of a paper record, one might have a blind
audition, as orchestras have discovered.)68 One might still resort
to in-person interviews as a tiebreaker, but only in cases where
the resumes or other blind qualifications are indeterminate. This
obtains useful information while reducing bias.
Is this too far-fetched to be helpful to the plain meaning rule?
We are not so sure. It seems at least conceivable to us that something like the practical consequences of a statutory interpretation
might fit this model. Judges might well be committed to the view
that practical consequences are relevant but of secondary importance to more standard legal materials like text and so on. On
the other hand, judges might also worry that once they take into
account practical considerations, it is hard to think clearly about
anything else, and hard to resist the urge to start reinterpreting
the standard materials to match the consequences the judges
want to see. Alternatively, even if judges are confident in their
own ability to weigh practical consequences appropriately, those
same judges might worry about the ability of other judges to do
the same.
65 See generally, for example, Regina Pingitore, et al, Bias against Overweight Job
Applicants in a Simulated Employment Interview, 79 J Applied Psychology 909 (1994);
David C. Gilmore, Terry A. Beehr, and Kevin G. Love, Effects of Applicant Sex, Applicant
Physical Attractiveness, Type of Rater and Type of Job on Interview Decisions, 59 J Occupational Psychology 103 (1986); Comila Shahani, Robert L. Dipboye, and Thomas M.
Gehrlein, Attractiveness Bias in the Interview: Exploring the Boundaries of an Effect, 14
Basic & Applied Soc Psychology 317 (1993).
66 See David Hausman, Note, How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by
Promoting Anonymous Hiring, 64 Stan L Rev 1343, 1349–55 (2012).
67 See Farewell to the Eastern APA, Redux? (Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog, Sept
13, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/JJR4-LVBQ?type=image (discussing Princeton’s interview policy in the comments).
68 See generally Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The
Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 Am Econ Rev 715 (2000).
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If this bias is worrisome—and it might be especially worrisome if the practical considerations are ones with deeply contested partisan valences—then we can see why judges might want
the plain meaning rule to deal with it: Blind themselves to practical consequences in a range of cases where the text is clear and
therefore the likelihood of changing the outcome is small relative
to the likelihood of bias. But consider practical consequences
when the text is unclear, and the information provided by those
consequences is more important.
But again, even so, this bias justification for the plain meaning rule is tricky. The biasing information has to be of a specific
type that slightly defies rational thought. And it has to be useful
enough to be worth accepting that bias in some cases, and yet not
so useful that it is worth accepting that bias in all cases.69 That
might happen to be true of something like practical consequences,
but we do not really know for sure. (So far as we know, neither
the Princeton philosophy department nor orchestras suddenly
start resorting to in-person interviews or auditions when it is a
close case.)
At the same time, we are fairly confident that most other
instances of the plain meaning rule—when dealing with titles,
statutory context, legislative history, etc.—could not be justified
this way. Judges are likely capable of rationally counting or discounting this material as appropriate. Or, at least, they are as
capable of dealing rationally with this material as they are with
anything else.
C.

Legal Convention

An alternative justification, of sorts, might proceed in a more
legalistic way: judges should follow the plain meaning rule because it is a rule, and judges should follow the rules. We recognize
that this argument sounds hilariously circular—where did the
rule come from?—but we think a version of it can be made to work.
One way is by focusing on the “law of interpretation.” This
argument requires us first to accept that rules of statutory interpretation can be set by law, in which case they need not be justified on first-order normative grounds. (Judges should follow the
rules of criminal procedure, one might say, not because the rules

69 We would add that this justification is even harder to sustain if the plain meaning
threshold is itself subject to bias, as some have argued. See notes 85–94 and accompanying
text.
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are necessarily justified on first principles but because judges
have assumed an obligation to follow the rules.) The second step
is to accept that those rules can also be established by unwritten
law, judicial custom that we often call common law.70
Under this argument, maybe the plain meaning rule is
simply a common-law rule of statutory interpretation. It might
not make perfect logical sense, but judges should apply it just as
much as they apply other logically imperfect common-law rules.
There is another variation of this argument: Even if one does
not accept that unwritten law can create binding rules of interpretation (though one should!), one could arrive at a version of
this argument through expectations. Perhaps Congress knows
about the plain meaning rule and intends (or means) that its work
should be interpreted through the rule.
These justifications seem logically possible to us, but we still
have doubts about them. As to the second, expectations-based version of the argument, recent empirical research by Professors
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman has suggested that Congress does
not know very much about the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation rules, suggesting that we should be hesitant to justify
interpretive rules purely on the basis of expectations.71 To be sure,
the plain meaning rule might turn out to be an exception. The
Gluck and Bressman study did report that when asked to name
an “interpretive rule[ ] or convention[ ] in particular you think
that the U.S. Supreme Court consistently follows,”72 staffers did
frequently come up with “the plain meaning rule” by name.73 But
because of the strictly consistent, empirical method of the study,
we do not know if the respondents specifically had in mind the
consider-only-in-case-of-ambiguity version of the plain meaning

70 For an extended argument in defense of these claims, see William Baude and
Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv L Rev 1079, 1104–18 (2017).
71 See generally Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman and Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation,
and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan L Rev 725 (2014).
72 Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside: Methods Appendix *40 (Stanford Law Review, May 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/SR6K-6UPA.
73 Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 995 (cited in note 71).
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rule or instead associated “plain” with “ordinary”74 or something
else.75
Similarly, we doubt that the plain meaning rule is sufficiently
well established to qualify as a binding rule of the unwritten law
of interpretation. While such rules can be valid even if Congress
is not deeply familiar with them,76 discussion of the plain meaning
rule is sufficiently confused that we still doubt that the rule qualifies.77 It is more plausible, however, that some limited instances
of the plain meaning rule could be part of the law of interpretation—for instance, one of us has argued that this is the best way
to judge the “substantive” canons of interpretation.78
In any event, even if one of these convention-based justifications for the plain meaning rule did hold, it would be a justification of a limited sort. It would justify judges’ invoking and applying the rule now, but it would tell us little about whether we ought
to change the convention going forward, or about whether we
ought to replicate it when implementing authoritative rules of interpretation in other contexts. Indeed, if one accepts our other normative doubts about the plain meaning rule, then those doubts
provide reason to approach these conventions with a wary eye.
D. Public-Facing Explanation
It is also possible that there is a difference between a court’s
own reasoning process and the reasoning process it presents to
the audience of its opinions. Or, to put a finer point on it, maybe
the plain meaning doctrine is a public lie or, more generously, an
oversimplification.79 The court does in fact consider all of the evidence, but it does not want the reader to do so because it does not
trust the reader to weigh the evidence accurately.
For instance, when interpreting a statute, maybe a judge really does consider the title of the statute, or the legislative history,
even when the text seems plain to that judge. (Indeed, one would
often have to go out of one’s way not to consider it, and we doubt
that Justice Kagan gets mad at her clerks if they tell her the title

74

See note 40 and accompanying text.
See Abbe Gluck, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, E-mail to William Baude (Jan
21, 2016) (on file with authors).
76 See Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1108–09 (cited in note 70).
77 See Part I.
78 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1121–22 (cited in note 70).
79 See, for example, Return of the Jedi (Lucasfilm 1983) (“So, what I told you was
true—from a certain point of view.”).
75
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of the statute or present her with other information outside of a
clear text.)80 Perhaps judges do not think those things are really
irrelevant, the same way they might think that a litigant’s race or
criminal history is irrelevant.81 At the same time, they want to
encourage the reader not to worry herself about them.
Under this justification, then, it is not actually true that outside information is ignored when the meaning is plain. Rather,
judges think that the outside information will change the purely
textual result only in an unusual case, and when the information
does not change the result, it is better to pretend that it could not
have changed the result. In other words, the court considers both
text and other materials, but in cases in which the text wins, the
court pretends it did not look at the other materials in the first
place.
Why might a court do this? Perhaps it does not fully trust its
audience. When presenting its textual argument to nonjudges
and even lay people, who are not as steeped in the court’s conventions of statutory interpretation, it makes sense to speak in accessible shorthand. Courts really mean something like, “When the
text is 80 percent clear, it is almost impossible for even 100 percent clear legislative history to outweigh it.” But it is easier for
courts to say, as they do, that we should not even consider the
legislative history at all in cases of textual clarity.
Or, to put it slightly less nobly, maybe judges worry that acknowledging the countervailing factor will make their interpretation seem much weaker. Better to invoke a legalistic-sounding
reason that the title and legislative history do not matter rather
than to candidly say: “True enough, but still . . . the text wins.”
As a descriptive matter, these accounts seem plausible to us,
at least some of the time. But as a normative matter, they raise
the usual questions about a duty of judicial sincerity.82 And, in
any event, they “justify” invocations of the plain meaning rule
only in the pyrrhic sense of saying that none of them should be
taken seriously by legally sophisticated readers.

80 Indeed, in several cases in which the Court has invoked the plain meaning rule, it
has gone on to discuss the evidence it just declared irrelevant. See, for example, Milner,
562 US at 572, 578–80 (Kagan).
81 But see Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 Colum L Rev 404, 432–38 (2012)
(noting “gratuitous” judicial references to the race of litigants and others).
82 See generally Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va L Rev 987 (2008);
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv L Rev 731 (1987). But see generally Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 Mich L Rev 296 (1990).
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Predictability and Consistency

Additionally, the plain meaning rule might make sense—under certain extremely specific assumptions—if one were willing to
trade accuracy for predictability. Suppose, for example, that a regulated private party cares not very much about whether she has
the meaning of the statute “right” in the abstract, but cares a
great deal about whether she correctly guesses how a judge will
interpret the statute. That party might prefer that the range of
considerations for a judge be limited in cases in which one consideration—the text—points clearly in one direction. “If I look up the
statute and see that it says clearly what I can do,” she might reason, “I want to be able to take that to the bank.”
A judge might reason similarly, regarding consistency in
decision-making across courts as worth promoting so long as the
accuracy trade-off is minimal. Thus, a judge might think it best
to stop if the text is “clear” because she is confident that her colleagues would read the statute in the same way. More still, because plain meaning is reasonably probative of statutory meaning, the resulting gains in consistency would be accompanied by
only minimal losses in accuracy.
As before, note that this justification requires some tricky assumptions. It is not enough to argue—as many have83—that text
is a useful coordinating point. That argument would be more
likely to point toward textualism across the board. Rather, it requires an argument that text is only sometimes useful as a coordinating point. The underlying intuition seems to be that when
the text is plain, the coordinating function is strong and the loss
in accuracy is weak, but when the text is less plain, we should flip
to emphasizing accuracy over coordination.84
83 Professor Frederick Schauer, for example, has argued that a general presumption
in favor of ordinary meaning has a coordinating function, because it is likely to serve as
“common ground” among members of a linguistic community. Schauer, 1990 S Ct Rev at
250–56 (cited in note 40). For that reason, Schauer has argued, a “group of [otherwise-]
diverse decisionmakers might suppress some of that diversity and achieve agreement” by
substantially restricting the basis for decision-making to that which is common to the
group, namely, ordinary meaning. Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain
Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 Vand L Rev 715, 724–25 (1992). This
argument does not seem to point toward the conditional evidence rules of the plain meaning rule.
84 An intriguing suggestion that might work along these lines comes from Professor
Adam M. Samaha, who has argued that the need for a random tiebreaker can be reduced
by “moving a relevant variable into a lexically inferior position. The reduction in ties from
lexical ordering is usually greater than the reduction from adding the same variable to the
mix of other relevant considerations. The cost, however, is a higher error rate.” Adam M.
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Maybe that argument could work, but it rests on several empirical assumptions. And these assumptions seem even more
questionable than in the examples above.
The first required assumption is that the plain meaning
threshold is itself reasonably plain—in other words, that most interpreters can agree on which textual meanings are plain. Consider the regulated private party who wants to “take it to the
bank.” For her to do so sensibly, her perception of the plainness
of the statute’s meaning would itself need to be widely shared. If,
by contrast, interpreters frequently disagree over whether a statute’s meaning is plain, then the private party cannot be sure that
what is plain to her will be plain to others.
Worse, if courts do not agree on the plainness thresholds in
particular cases, the plain meaning rule can actually exacerbate
unpredictability. Courts that are 80 percent sure from the text
that the statute means X will sit resolute in their convictions, because the plain meaning rule tells them to consider no other evidence. Courts that are merely 54 percent sure from the text that
the statute means X, however, will open the door to other evidence, which in turn increases the risk that they will move from
X to something else. Because the plain meaning rule creates an
interpretive cliff between “plain” and “nonplain” meaning, the
predictability of that threshold becomes important to predicting
what courts will do.
The current evidence suggests that this assumption is false—
that is, the plain meaning threshold is highly vulnerable to dispute (good faith and otherwise85). The leading empirical study
showed that different interpreters attribute ambiguity to the
same text at quite different rates,86 and that those “simple judgments about ambiguity are entwined with policy preferences, and
. . . there may well be a causal relationship between them.”87 It
also showed that even when asked a less policy-laden question, to
predict whether others will find a text ambiguous, interpreters

Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U Chi L Rev 1661, 1664 (2010). He went on to discuss
the plain meaning rule as an example of lexical priority, though he acknowledged that
other tiebreakers are available in some cases (such as lenity in criminal cases). See id at
1708–10.
85 See Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 Nw U L Rev 811, 840–41 (2016)
(discussing willful or motivated mischaracterization of the clarity of legislative texts).
86 See generally Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior, and Anup Malani, Ambiguity about Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J Legal Analysis
257 (2010).
87 Id at 271.
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remained divided.88 Another study, this one of contract interpretation, found that both judges and laypeople overestimate the extent to which their interpretation is widely shared.89 “Thus,” the
study concluded, “a judge may consider language to be plain when
in fact different people do not understand it the same way, and
this may happen even when the judge’s understanding is shared
only by a minority of people in general.”90
Even worse, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, a sitting judge on the
DC Circuit, has asserted that his colleagues cannot even agree on
what the plain meaning threshold is. He reported:
In practice, I probably apply something approaching a 65-35
rule. In other words, if the interpretation is at least 65-35
clear, then I will call it clear and reject reliance on ambiguitydependent canons. I think a few of my colleagues apply more
of a 90-10 rule, at least in certain cases. Only if the proffered
interpretation is at least 90-10 clear will they call it clear. By
contrast, I have other colleagues who appear to apply a 55-45
rule. If the statute is at least 55-45 clear, that’s good enough
to call it clear.
Who is right in that debate? Who knows?91
Kavanaugh also went on to agree that “even if my colleagues and
I could agree on 65-35” as the threshold for clarity, it would be
“difficult” for them to apply it “neutrally, impartially, and predictably.”92 Rather, “the magic wand of ipse dixit is the standard tool
for deciding such matters.” 93 For these reasons, Kavanaugh advocated “eliminating or reducing threshold determinations of clarity
versus ambiguity.”94
A second assumption required for the consistency-and-accuracy
argument is that nontextual evidence is substantially less probative
88 See, for example, id at 272 (“All respondents considering that case are 55 percent
likely to say the statute is ambiguous when asked for an external judgment.”).
89 See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt, and Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias
in Contract Interpretation, 108 Colum L Rev 1268, 1285–94 (2008).
90 Id at 1294.
91 Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2137–38 (cited in note 37) (citation
omitted).
92 Id at 2138.
93 Id at 2140 (quotation marks and brackets omitted), quoting Farnsworth, Guzior,
and Malani, 2 J Legal Analysis at 276 (cited in note 86).
94 Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2134 (cited in note 37) (emphasis
omitted). Even Justice Scalia and Professor Garner, after describing the plain meaning
rule as “essentially sound,” conceded that it is “largely unhelpful, since determining what
is unambiguous is eminently debatable.” Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 436 (cited in
note 42).
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of statutory meaning than is text viewed in isolation. To see why,
consider a case in which text in isolation points plainly in one direction but nontextual evidence points plainly in another. In such
a case, a court that considers just the text will have reasonably
high confidence as to statutory meaning.95 If nontextual evidence
has only limited weight, going on to consider that evidence will
predictably leave the court only less confident. The reason is that
considering this less weighty evidence will not alter the court’s
confidence very much, certainly not enough to make it as or more
confident in the alternate reading that the nontextual evidence
supports.96 If, by contrast, nontextual evidence has significant
weight, going on to consider it may leave the court as or more
confident in the alternate reading—particularly so if the nontextual evidence has an undercutting effect, undermining the evidential connection between the text in isolation and the initial reading (for example, by making apparent a previously unrecognized
ambiguity).97 The predictability of the plain meaning rule thus depends on the nontextual evidence that is being excluded having
limited probative value.98
95 This should be the case regardless of whether a court regards the text as “clear.”
See text accompanying note 91. Even if a court takes the text to be less than clear, it should
still be reasonably confident in the interpretation supported by the text in isolation (for
example, a confidence level of 0.7 as opposed to 0.9), at least absent additional, nontextual
evidence.
96 Again, this should be the case regardless of perceived clarity. As a practical matter,
this is crucial to the attractiveness of the plain meaning rule because otherwise the rule
would allow for wildly divergent outcomes depending on whether a text is regarded as
clear or slightly less than clear.
97 See John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge 37–39 (Rowman &
Littlefield 1986) (distinguishing between “rebutting” defeaters, which prevent evidence E
from supporting belief in proposition P by supporting not-P more strongly, and “undercutting” defeaters, which prevent E from supporting belief in P by undermining the apparent
rational connection between E and P) (emphasis omitted).
98 Philosopher Lara Buchak has argued that, as a matter of both instrumental and
epistemic rationality, a “risk-avoidant agent” sometimes does best not to consider all available evidence before making a decision, even if considering additional evidence is cost free.
See Lara Buchak, Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering,
24 Philosophical Persp 85, 96–101 (2010). On the standard picture of instrumental rationality, an instrumentally rational agent maximizes expected utility, which is to say that, of two
acts, an instrumentally rational agent prefers the one with the higher expected-utility
value. In a classic paper, Professor I.J. Good showed that, assuming away behavioral irrationalities of the sort discussed in Part III.B, so long as considering additional evidence
is cost free, it always maximizes expected utility to do so before making a decision. See
generally I.J. Good, On the Principle of Total Evidence, 17 Brit J Phil Sci 319 (1967). From
this, Good inferred that it is always instrumentally rational to consider such evidence and,
from this, that to do so is always epistemically rational as well—that is, rational in one’s
capacity as an agent concerned with truth or knowledge. See generally id. In her work,
Buchak has offered an alternative to the standard picture of instrumental, and in turn
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This empirical assumption is also open to question. As both of
us have argued elsewhere, a court’s perception of what Congress
is trying to say depends in large part on that court’s understanding of what Congress is trying to do.99 By unsettling a court’s priors about what Congress is plausibly trying to do, nontextual evidence can thus alter significantly a court’s assessment of what
Congress is attempting to say. For example, taken in isolation, a
rule that reads, “No police officers are permitted,” would seem to
tell law enforcement officials to stay away. Add as additional context, however, that the text appears beneath the heading, “Costume restrictions for Halloween party,” and that interpretation
becomes much less obvious. Whether nontextual evidence can unsettle priors in this way—and, hence, exert significant evidentiary weight—is difficult to assess on a categorical basis. Sometimes bad practical consequences will, for instance, reveal a
particular interpretation as implausible.100 Other times, though,
such consequences will show only that the most plausible interpretation is also bad policy.101
It may well be that some instances (or even all instances) of
the plain meaning rule could be shown to satisfy these assumptions. But the current evidence makes that unlikely, and in any
event we are pretty sure that those who invoke the plain meaning
rule have rarely satisfied themselves of it.

epistemic, rationality, arguing that actual agents are—according to Buchak, reasonably—
risk avoidant in the sense that such agents are unwilling to accept the possibility of a loss
in exchange for an equivalently sized possibility of a gain. See generally, for example, Lara
Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Oxford 2013). Needless to say, assessing the merits of
Buchak’s alternative, risk-avoidant picture of rationality goes well beyond the scope of this
Article. See Buchak, 24 Philosophical Persp at 96 (cited in note 98) (conceding that there
are “those who are inclined to think that theories like [hers] are theories of predictable
irrationality”) (emphasis added). Of special interest here, though, is Buchak’s observation
that, to the extent that risk avoidance is rational, a risk-avoidant agent ought not to consider additional cost-free evidence under certain conditions. Specifically, Buchak showed
that a risk-avoidant agent should refuse to consider such evidence if she is “antecedently
fairly confident that X” and if that evidence could “tell somewhat in favor of ~X but not
strongly in favor of ~X,” that is, if the evidence at issue has only limited weight. Id at 100
(emphasis omitted). Thus, to the extent that risk avoidance recommends ignoring additional
evidence, it does so under similar conditions as does the predictability-and-consistency rationale articulated here.
99 See Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1144–45 (cited in note 70); Ryan D.
Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 Duke L J 979, 994–98 (2017).
100 See, for example, United States v X-Citement Video, Inc, 513 US 64, 69–70 (1994).
101 See, for example, Pavelic & LeFlore v Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 US 120,
126 (1989).
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Contract Analogies

Finally, we think it instructive to contrast the plain meaning rule with seemingly analogous arguments in interpretation
of private law. Consider first Professor Eric Posner’s argument
in favor of the parol evidence rule in contract law,102 which has
some analogies to the predictability justification canvassed
above. The parol evidence rule forbids courts from considering
extrinsic evidence of a contract’s meaning unless that contract
is incomplete or ambiguous on its face.103 Posner defended the
rule on the ground that “parties derive advantage from being
able, in their contract, to limit the evidence a court can use to
decide a dispute should one arise,” because, among other
things, limiting admissible evidence reduces variance in judicial outcomes.104
For our purposes, what is particularly instructive about
Posner’s argument is that it highlights several important differences between contracts and legislation, and therefore between
the parol evidence rule and the plain meaning rule. First, Posner’s
claim concerning derived advantage rests in large part on the
empirical observation that contracting parties make frequent
use of so-called “merger” clauses, which are clauses directing
courts not to consider extrinsic evidence, whereas “anti-merger”
clauses, which are clauses directing courts to consider such evidence, are more or less unknown.105 In legislation, by contrast,
analogues of merger clauses are rare,106 whereas analogues of

102 See generally Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule,
and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U Pa L Rev 533 (1998).
103 See id at 534. Posner referred to this as “hard-PER,” distinguished from softer
versions of the rule. Id at 534–35.
104 Id at 570–71. See also id at 543. Posner also argued that contracting parties share
an intention about the conventions of contract interpretation, see id at 570, somewhat
analogous to the argument we discuss in Part III.C.
105 Id at 570–71.
106 For the rare example, see Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(b), Pub L No 102-166, 105
Stat 1071, 1075, codified at 42 USC § 1981 note:

No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing
or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove—Business
necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
See also Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation 187
(Chicago 2010) (observing that “[e]ven such small limits” on what evidence of statutory
meaning courts can consider “are not easy to find”).
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antimerger clauses are, if anything, slightly less so.107 Neither is
common.
Second, Posner’s prediction of reduced variance under the
parol evidence rule assumes the relative unpredictability of judicial responsiveness to extrinsic evidence. Because the extrinsic
evidence parties might introduce in a given case is so varied—
anything from “excerpts from the general chit-chat” to “pages of
scrawled notes”—Posner inferred that how a given court will respond to the evidence introduced is much less predictable than
how that court will respond to contractual language in isolation.108
By contrast, the major categories of nontextual evidence in statutory interpretation are more systematic, and so judicial responsiveness to such evidence is more predictable. At a practical level,
for example, we think many lawyers have a good guess as to how
different justices on the Supreme Court would respond to the invocation of a committee report.
Finally, Posner’s argument assumes that contracting parties
are responsive to judicial interpretive rules. Plausible as that assumption might be for contracts, there are two reasons to doubt
it in the case of legislation. One reason is recent empirical work
that suggests that legislative drafters do not know much about
the judicial interpretive rules.109 The other is that the transaction
costs for negotiating legislation are much higher than they are for
contracts because of both the complexity and the conventions of
legislation.110 (Related elements of the legislative process may
give legislators more reason than contracting parties to be strategically vague in drafting.)111
107 See, for example, 16 USC § 831dd (“This chapter shall be liberally construed to . . .
provide for the national defense, improve navigation, control destructive floods, and promote interstate commerce and the general welfare.”); 18 USC § 3731 (“The provisions of
this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”).
108 Posner, 146 U Pa L Rev at 572 (cited in note 102).
109 See generally Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev 901 (cited in note 71). See also
generally Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 NYU L Rev 575 (2002).
110 See Posner, 146 U Pa L Rev at 553–55 (cited in note 102) (observing that the parol
evidence rule is least likely to be useful when transaction costs are high (as when the text
is complex) and when the form of the contract at issue is conventional (as is the case with,
for example, ordinary consumer contracts)). See also Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 Colum L Rev 807, 816
(2014) (describing the professionalization of the legislative drafting process, noting the
emphasis on “consistency of legislative drafting”); Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of
Gridlock, 88 Notre Dame L Rev 2065, 2075 (2013) (“The United States federal government
has a relatively [ ] cumbersome process for enacting laws.”).
111 See Christine Kexel Chabot, Selling Chevron, 67 Admin L Rev 481, 522–25 (2015).
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As the example of the parol evidence rule suggests, practical
differences between contracting and legislating will often differentiate the plain meaning rule from superficially similar rules of
contract law. Such practical differences also explain away another
superficially similar rule, the so-called best evidence rule, which
conditions the admissibility of secondary evidence (for example,
facsimile or oral description) of the contents of a document on the
unavailability of the original copy.112 As Professor Frederick
Schauer has observed, strict application of the best evidence rule
“imposes cumbersome requirements on the introduction of reliable
secondary evidence.”113 Nonetheless, Schauer reasoned, the best
evidence rule is plausibly justifiable as an evidence-generating
rule, because, by making it difficult for parties to introduce (presumably reliable) secondary evidence, the rule incentivizes parties to preserve and produce (presumably more reliable) primary
evidence.114
As noted above, that legislators respond to incentives set by
interpretive rules is, at best, questionable. More to the point here,
though, is that the practical problem the best evidence rule is designed to solve—failure to preserve and produce primary evidence—does not exist with respect to legislation, at least not today.115 In the modern era, primary evidence of the contents of
legislation (for example, the Statutes at Large and the United
States Code) is available at the click of a mouse. There is thus no
need to cajole legislators or litigants to further preserve and produce that evidence.
CONCLUSION
There is much to be said about the comparative superiority of
text, statutory context, legislative history, consequences, and so
on in statutory interpretation. In this Article, we’ve tried to make

112

See, for example, Sirico v Cotto, 324 NYS2d 483, 485–86 (NY City Civ 1971).
Schauer, 155 U Pa L Rev at 198 (cited in note 47).
114 Id.
115 By contrast, in the decades after the Founding, statutes “were not regularly published,” and “[e]ven when copies of records could be found, the copies themselves were
highly unreliable.” Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va L
Rev 1201, 1209–10 (2009). As Professor Stephen E. Sachs showed, this made the best evidence rule highly important to statutes at the Founding (and central to the Constitution’s
Full Faith and Credit Clause). See id at 1209–12.
113
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a related but different intervention, about the relationship between those things.116 Whatever one thinks of the probative value
of text and other evidence, it’s not at all obvious why one source’s
probative value should depend on the other.
The plain meaning rule reflects that kind of puzzling interdependence. There are indeed conditions under which such a rule
would make sense, but they are more complicated and less universal than most uses of the plain meaning rule seem to assume.117 It may well be that most interpreters should simply have
the courage of their convictions—either to consider nontextual
evidence in all cases or to ignore it across the board.
Ultimately, though, we come neither to praise the plain
meaning rule nor to bury it. Our main aim is to challenge those
who use the rule to consider and explain why they think nontextual evidence is relevant at some times but not at others—and to
show all readers that the challenge is harder to answer than they
might have first thought.

116 Ironically, the plain meaning rule may in fact cause courts to devalue the statutory
text. The plain meaning rule requires text to be considered first, to decide what other
sources can be considered. But as Professor Samaha recently observed, empirical evidence
suggests that, “[o]ften enough, last matters more than first” in that, as a psychological
matter, decision-makers often attribute greater significance to evidence considered at the
end of a sequence than at the beginning. Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the Text—on
Sequencing Effects in Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J Legal Analysis 439, 456
(2016). Thus, textualists who do decide to retain the plain meaning rule might do well to
counsel “circling back” to the unclear text after other sources have been let in. Id at 481.
117 See Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2135 n 87 (cited in note 37)
(“[E]ach ambiguity-dependent canon should be independently evaluated. I am not proposing a one-size-fits-all solution.”).

